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The Poetics of Information 
Overload: From Gertrude Stein 
to Conceptual Writing by Paul 
Stephens. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2015. 240 + 
xvi pp. Paperback: $25.00
I have nearly unlimited 
access to music; I can audio-
record my entire day; I can 
record high-definition video 
and send it wirelessly. There 
are over forty thousand mes-
sages in my Gmail inbox. 
The world’s major newspa-
pers are continually updated 
by the minute. Thanks to 
my mobile web browser, I 
have access to more words 
than were contained in the 
National Library of Ireland 
on June 16, 1904. On that 
day, Leopold Bloom carried 
the following items in his 
pocket. (ix)
What do we mean by information? 
How can we discuss its poetics—
the discourse of the making of art 
or writing as its condition of pos-
sibility? There are three distinct 
uses of the term at work in Paul 
Stephens’s revisionist history of 
the American avant-garde tradi-
tion. Stephens’s baseline narrative 
is the pervasive sense of being over-
whelmed that we live and suffer on 
a daily basis, readily identifiable in 
the quotation above and reflected 
in the covers of self-help publica-
tions with titles such as Surviving 
Information Overload, Information 
Anxiety, and Overload! How Too 
Much Information Is Hazardous 
to Your Organization (xii–xiii). A 
second narrative begins with mod-
ernism’s imitation of information 
surplus, represented by the list of 
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random items in Leopold Bloom’s 
pocket, continuing through the tex-
tual experiments of Gertrude Stein 
and the avant-garde “Revolution of 
the Word” of the 1930s, and end-
ing at a point of convergence with 
conceptual art and writing, from 
the 1960s to now. As initial prem-
ise, Stephens wants to show how 
modernism and the avant-garde 
in its development recognized, 
contested, transformed, and made 
something new out of the techno-
logical development of what has 
been called, from the 1950s on, the 
“information society.” The two 
narratives of development parallel 
and support each other, in a con-
tinuous present of technological 
determinism: the increasing ten-
dency toward ever-greater infor-
mation resources as a consequence 
of the media and technology that 
create and access them and the par-
allel development of avant-garde 
forms that represent or reflect on 
surplus information. Stephens’s 
focus on the avant-garde—despite 
disparities of scale between big data 
or mass media and the elusive and 
inaccessible works of individuals 
and coteries—is his overarching 
claim: that works of experimental 
art and literature provide the best 
register, and potential remedy for, 
the condition in which we live: 
“Although information technology 
has typically been figured as hos-
tile or foreign to poetry, . . . avant-
garde poetry has been centrally 
concerned with technologies of 
communication, data storage, and 
bureaucratic control—not simply 
rejecting those technologies, but 
also adopting and commenting on 
them” (1).
Innovations of modernist and 
avant-garde poetics thus intersect 
with information in ways that pro-
duce a proliferation of forms that 
reflect on, as they counteract, this 
overload. But here the question is 
precisely how the convergence of 
poetic form and what Mark Poster 
termed “the mode of information” 
takes place. At the basis of this 
question is what is meant by “infor-
mation” and even more specifically 
its relation to the language that 
embodies it. Mediated processes of 
storage and retrieval are anything 
but neutral to the information—or 
the knowledge and language—
they represent. At the intersection 
of information and poetics is a set 
of parallel but also negative condi-
tions in which, for Poster, “the rep-
resentational function of language 
has been placed in question by the 
differential communicational pat-
terns each of which shift to the 
forefront the self-referential aspect 
of language.”1 Rendering a form 
of knowledge—for example, the 
catalogue of the National Library 
of Ireland—into information (the 
card catalogue that accesses it) 
transforms the library’s content 
into something entirely different, 
a differential system that turns its 
content into a formalized set of 
metadata.
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For Ron Day, the modern inven-
tion of information is thus a politi-
cally and culturally invested process 
that leads to social “command and 
control,” on the one hand, along 
with the illusion of an equivalence 
and transparency of information 
in its major forms, on the other: 
“Information and communication 
technologies are not just repre-
sentational or ‘virtual’ at the level 
of presenting visual or auditory 
simulacra; they themselves may 
constitute instances of representa-
tion or virtuality insofar as they are 
substitutional or tropic figurations 
that mediate the future both tech-
nologically and semiotically.”2 The 
concept of “information overload” 
depends on such large-scale figura-
tions, in ways that obscure or over-
write the relation of information 
to the objects of knowledge or lan-
guage it represents. “Information” 
is thus a differential rather than a 
positive term, as it produces a form 
of representation—metadata, code, 
or language—that strips the object 
of knowledge from its manner of 
indexical organization. In order 
to access fully the potential rela-
tionship of forms of poetry and 
art to information, then, the poet-
ics of information itself must be 
described, not in the metaphor of 
a “mass of data” but in the precise 
constitution of its elements.
The third narrative of infor-
mation poetics, then, must be that 
which comprehends the specific-
ity of both terms. Information 
in this sense reflects the develop-
ment of information theory, after 
its primary instance in Claude 
Shannon and Warren Weaver’s 
The Mathematical Theory of 
Communication (1948). For 
Shannon and Weaver, informa-
tion is the radical stripping of con-
tent (the message to be conveyed) 
from its mode of communication, 
reduced to a measure representing 
the probability of its being received 
as message as its quantity of infor-
mation. The mathematics of quan-
tifying information as probability 
led Shannon and Weaver to reduce 
information to its minimal unit, the 
bit or binary digit, from which as 
we know all computer languages 
and digital media are now built. 
Reducing information to minimal 
units is provisionally a radical for-
malism in which meaning, mes-
sage, or content are elided for their 
greater technological capacity for 
being transmitted and received. 
However, even at the basic level of 
the construction of information as 
a probabilistic calculation of mini-
mal units or bits, there is a payoff 
for a politics of information over-
load in a positive as well as negative 
sense: “The concept of information 
applies not to the individual mes-
sages (as the concept of meaning 
would), but rather to the situation 
as a whole, the unit information 
indicating that in this situation one 
has an amount of freedom of choice, 
in selecting a message, which it is 
convenient to regard as a standard 
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or unit amount.”3 The radical par-
ticularity of the bit, then, implies a 
horizon of freedom of choice that 
works through the probability of 
transmission to the meaning, mes-
sage, or content that may be located 
through it (a freedom that may 
refer to post–World War II repu-
diations of totalitarian systems of 
meaning, Stalinist or fascist, that 
restrict “freedom of choice”).
Katherine Hayles, in How 
We Became Posthuman, devel-
ops another line from the radi-
cal formalism of the bit and its 
consequent dematerialization of 
content, seeing the relationship 
between information and mean-
ing in the digital age to be the result 
of the persistence of immateriality 
within material forms as what she 
terms “virtuality”: “From ATMs 
to the Internet, from the morph-
ing programs used in Terminator 
II to the sophisticated visualization 
programs used to guide microsur-
geries, information is increasingly 
perceived as interpenetrating mate-
rial forms. . . . From here it is a small 
step to perceiving information as 
more mobile, more important, 
more essential than material forms. 
When this impression becomes 
part of your cultural mindset, you 
have entered the condition of vir-
tuality.”4 Hayles’s derivation of 
“virtuality” leads from media tech-
nology to the fantasmatic fiction 
and “information narratives” she 
reads, in which information and 
materiality combine and “data are 
thus humanized, and subjectivity 
is computerized, allowing them to 
join in a symbiotic union whose 
result is narrative.”5
But it may equally be the abstract 
“freedom of choice,” not merely the 
perception of informatic pattern-
ing, that results from the stripping 
of content to bits that is most crucial 
for an information poetics. Here, 
the radical particularity of the bit 
suggests a relationship to the ubiq-
uitous formal device of the nonnar-
rative foregrounding of the part 
within a larger whole that we find 
everywhere in works of the avant-
garde, from Marcel Duchamp 
and William Carlos Williams to 
Language and conceptual writ-
ing.6 Poets and conceptual artists, 
in a way entirely different from the 
virtual fantasies of cyber- or post-
modern fiction, exploit the tension 
between abstract information and 
its material embodiment in alter-
native forms. A central strength of 
Stephens’s Poetics of Information 
Overload, then, is not merely to 
draw a technologically determined 
parallel between information soci-
ety and the avant-garde but to 
show how a series of nonnarra-
tive forms, which foreground both 
materiality and particularity, inter-
sect with the technological series in 
ways that do not simply reproduce 
it. The history of avant-garde for-
mal innovation will not necessarily 
be progressive, teleological, or even 
consistent. Rather, it shows how the 
forms of the avant-garde provide 
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ways of comprehending the vast-
ness and abstraction of informa-
tion while not simply succumbing 
to it—although here an objection 
may be raised of the avant-garde’s 
self-reflexive textualization, a posi-
tion taken by Paul Mann in his The 
Theory Death of the Avant-Garde 
(1991).7 But in positive terms, the 
avant-garde produces forms of 
“know-that” in terms of informa-
tion society that are also forms of 
“know-how”: the specific poetics of 
the avant-garde text itself as a form 
of agency. In showing how to avoid 
a “becoming virtual” that dissolves 
us into an overwhelming mass of 
data, avant-garde forms are impor-
tant precisely because they rema-
terialize what has been stripped 
from the knowledge and content 
of information. Their material-
ity and radical particularity thus 
counter the overstretched claims of 
simple technological determinism 
made by certain conceptual writ-
ers; the avant-garde rematerializes 
that which has been dematerial-
ized and thus provides a form of 
poetic self-reflexivity as “what to 
make” of information. Arguing 
with a certain cultural studies pes-
simism associated with the work of 
Friedrich Kittler, who opines that 
“under conditions of high technol-
ogy, literature has nothing more 
to say. It ends in cryptograms that 
defy interpretation and permit only 
interception,” Stephens responds, 
“Against Kittler’s pronouncement, 
poetries of information overload 
. . . demonstrate an extraordinary 
range of innovation responses to 
technological conditions” (36).8
Everything in such an argu-
ment for rematerialization and 
particularity depends on the 
example. Stephens’s avant-garde 
texts are both recognizable to the 
cognoscenti of the avant-garde 
and surprising for their consistent 
“responses to technological con-
ditions.” An opening paradigm 
for information overload in the 
modernist period must surely be 
Gertrude Stein’s 926-page The 
Making of Americans (1926), a text 
often seen as unreadable due to 
the sheer “wall of words” it pres-
ents. Stephens sees The Making 
of Americans as anything but the 
compendious archive (after Jacques 
Derrida’s Archive Fever) that many 
readers find it to be, of “everyone 
who ever was or will be living”; 
rather, it is a form of mediation and 
rematerialization that supplants 
abstract patterns of modern social 
organization with the human insis-
tence of her characters’ “bottom 
natures,” the facticity of their being 
that is not reducible to pattern. 
Even when David Hersland dies, 
thus entering the world of mere 
data, his death requires hundreds of 
pages of material text.9 Stein’s mod-
ern epic is framed, by Stephens, 
through her dismissal—in her 1946 
essay “Reflections on the Atomic 
Bomb”—of the technological sub-
lime, which she famously found to 
be “not interesting.” Whereas the 
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abstract informatics of technology 
do not compel her, she produces an 
information text of her own order.
Such a DIY response to infor-
mation overload is similarly evi-
dent in a slightly later, idiosyncratic 
project, the American expatriate 
poet Bob Brown’s “Readies,” in 
which he writes texts to be read 
and reproduced through machinic 
processes, much like contemporary 
ticker tape would reproduce stock 
prices. Brown’s Readie machine, 
while predicting technology to 
come, is also a homemade folly that 
both symptomatizes and ironically 
undermines information overload. 
For Stephens, “The dream of the 
reading machine is cybernetic. . . . 
The reading machine counters the 
entropic decay of local languages by 
means of something like Maxwell’s 
demon of reading, a demon who 
implants ideas directly into the 
brain of the globalized reader” (75). 
The ludic and even parodic impact 
of Brown’s project—its “hyperbolic 
boosterism” (75)—saves it from 
sheer technological determinism, 
on the one hand, and keeps it from 
being an instance of an as-yet-to-
come virtuality, on the other.
The modernist responses to 
information overload were written 
or imagined during a period when 
modernity was dominant but the 
forms of information society were 
not yet in place. With Charles 
Olson and later conceptual writers, 
however, reflection on the devel-
opment of information theory 
and cybernetics is readable in the 
forms and texts of the postmodern. 
Olson’s “The Kingfishers” (1949) 
prominently displays a quote from 
Norbert Weiner’s Cybernetics 
(1948): “And what is the mes-
sage? The message is / a discrete 
or continuous sequence of measur-
able events distributed in time,”10 
from about the time Olson invited 
Weiner onto the board of Black 
Mountain College. Two aspects 
of information theory and cyber-
netics are important for Olson: 
first, the project of an epic poem 
that organizes a vast archive of 
cultural information; and second, 
one that does so through forms of 
self-organization and autopoiesis 
that are irreducible to modernist 
forms of rational organization and 
knowledge retrieval. In counter-
ing modernity with poetic forms 
of cybernetic self-organization, 
Olson attempts to substitute the 
body of the poet as continuous with 
the world of things for the disso-
ciation of subject-centered reason. 
Stephens notes, “As a model for 
the acquisition of knowledge, pro-
prioception insists on an immedi-
acy of engagement between mind 
and body, body and polis, as well 
as body and planet” (105). The 
ultimate tragedy of Olson’s failure 
to realize this immediacy—at the 
limit of his physical body—under-
scores his difference from and 
contestation of the merely techno-
logical dimensions of cybernetics. 
What survives is Olson’s material 
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text, not the occasion of its mak-
ing (in the sense of Alfred North 
Whitehead’s concepts of “occa-
sion” and “event”).
The spectacular failure of imma-
nence in Olson’s poetics, however, 
led in the next decades to more 
restricted, procedural experiments 
in rematerializing information. 
While the forms of art and writing 
that developed in early conceptual 
art had their origins primarily in 
questions about the nature of art 
after the turn to abstract painting 
and pop art, an as-yet-unremarked 
series of writers—from John Cage 
to Bern Porter, Hannah Weiner, 
and Bernadette Mayer and others—
explored forms of textual material-
ity that, in retrospect, seem strongly 
motivated to reflect the excesses of 
information. Both the Information 
show at the Museum of Modern 
Art (1970) and Lucy Lippard’s Six 
Years: The Dematerialization of the 
Art Object . . . (1973) exhibit the 
turn to information as a central fea-
ture of conceptual art and writing.11 
Again, the material specificity of 
these projects counters the abstract 
formalism of information with 
texts that are often irreducible, 
unparaphrasable, intractable—
anything but data to be absorbed 
in machinic forms of storage and 
retrieval. Work of this period, for 
this reason, continues to inspire art-
ists and writers to explore textual 
forms that seem to perpetuate the 
informational sublime but in fact 
rematerialize it.
Stephens ends his genealogy of 
the avant-garde with Language 
and conceptual writing—the two 
movements that arguably gave him 
the framework for his series to begin 
with. The texts of Language writ-
ing, without question, often imitate 
or negotiate a vastness of scale of 
information that approaches the 
vastness of “language” itself, seen 
as a limit of the knowable and rep-
resentable. It is this convergence, 
then, of the medium of language 
with anything represented in it 
that creates both support for and a 
contrary movement to Stephens’s 
argument. In two of the narratives 
of information presented above—
of the parallel developments of 
technology and literary forms—we 
witness a progressive development 
of storage and transmission capac-
ity toward ever greater (and more 
frightening) horizons. The turn to 
language—unlike the unrestricted 
embodiment of “open field” 
poetry—creates a formal limit to 
informational vastness by the adop-
tion of language as its operative 
principle. Otherwise put, Language 
writing seems not to worry about 
the information explosion because 
no amount of mere data could ever 
equal the combinatorial infinity of 
language itself. In the period of its 
emergence, Language writing reg-
istered many aspects of the digital 
culture to come, particularly the 
influence of algorithmic and com-
putational procedures on formal 
strategies. Many Language writers 
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took jobs in the emerging cyber 
industry and have had careers 
there as much as in academia (a 
fact not sufficiently registered in its 
reception). But it is arguable that 
Language writing, across its many 
instances, did not seek to imitate or 
counter the development of digital 
media or information retrieval or 
the internet.
It is notable, then, that concep-
tual writers, concerned to distance 
themselves from the radical par-
ticularity of Language writing, 
claimed a technological determin-
ism in advance of their own formal 
innovations. As well, the notion 
that conceptual writing need not 
be read but only comprehended 
for its procedures has had a curi-
ously dematerializing impact on 
its otherwise massive texts—the 
prime example of which would be 
Kenneth Goldsmith’s retyping of 
one day’s edition of the New York 
Times, republished as the massive 
material text Day (2003).12 A nar-
rative of dematerialization—quite 
the opposite of the rematerialization 
evident in the genealogy from Stein 
to Language writing—suggests the 
possibility of an alternative politics: 
not a distancing comprehension of 
information overload but a seam-
less absorption into it. It is for this 
reason that this reader was gratified 
to see The Poetics of Information 
Overload conclude with a discus-
sion of the ur–Language writer 
Robert Grenier’s hand-drawn 
texts: the ultimate instance of 
antitechnological Luddism: regres-
sive, intractable works of idiosyn-
cratic genius that have since been 
scanned, digitized, archived, and 
made widely available online. 
Paul Stephens’s contribution to 
the theory of the avant-garde is to 
show how these poets and visual 
artists, in their strategies of radical 
particularity and rematerializa-
tion, reclaim agency in the face of 
information overload—rather than 
be absorbed seamlessly into mighty 
clouds of virtuality.
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